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Defendant StubHub appeals from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Jeffrey A. and Lisa S. Hill with 
respect to their claim that Defendant engaged in unfair or 
deceptive trade practices by violating the provisions of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-344.  On appeal, Defendant argues that 
Plaintiffs’ “ticket scalping” claim is barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230 
and that Defendant did not violate the “fee” provisions of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-344.  After careful consideration of Defendant’s 
challenges to the trial court’s order in light of the record and 
the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s order 
should be reversed. 
I. Background 
A. Substantive Facts 
Defendant operates an online marketplace that enables third 
parties to buy and sell tickets to sporting contests, concerts, 
and similar events.  Among other things, Defendant serves as an 
intermediary between buyers and sellers in order to facilitate 
transactions in which the identities of the buyer and the seller 
are not disclosed to each other.  As part of that process, 
sellers are provided with prepaid FedEx™ labels for shipping 
tickets; a guarantee of payment even if the buyer uses an 
invalid or fraudulent credit card; and the assurance that 
Defendant will assist in resolving any customer service issues 
that might arise.  On the other hand, buyers are assured that 
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they will receive valid tickets, or tickets of the same or equal 
value, in a timely manner. 
In order to consummate a transaction using Defendant’s 
website, a person must first create a user account, a process 
that requires the person to provide personal information and 
agree to abide by the terms and conditions set out in a User 
Agreement.  The User Agreement requires the user to agree to 
refrain from “us[ing] this Site for unlawful purposes or in an 
unlawful manner” and “to comply with all applicable local, 
state[,] federal and international laws, statutes and 
regulations regarding use of the Site and the selling of 
tickets,” including regulations governing the “selling value of 
the tickets.”1 
In the event that a ticket sale occurs, Defendant charges 
both parties for its services, with 10% of the ticket price 
deducted from the proceeds that would otherwise be payable to 
the seller and 15% of the ticket price, plus a shipping fee, 
added to the buyer’s total cost.  Defendant calculates the total 
amount due and provides the buyer with that information, 
processes the buyer’s payment, and remits the amount at which 
                     
1
In addition, Defendant provided notice that ticket scalping 
is illegal in North Carolina and reminded potential buyers that 
the price of tickets sold through its website might exceed face 
value.  However, Defendant also instructed potential sellers not 
to show the face value of the tickets that they were attempting 
to resell. 
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the ticket sold, less Defendant’s fee, to the seller.  As a 
result, the seller does not receive the buyer’s credit card 
information and the buyer does not learn the identity of the 
seller. 
In September, 2007, Plaintiffs decided to buy tickets to a 
“Miley Cyrus as Hannah Montana” concert to be held at the 
Greensboro Coliseum in November, 2007.  After unsuccessfully 
attempting to purchase tickets to this event using the 
Coliseum’s website, Ms. Hill purchased four tickets to the 
concert through Defendant’s website for $149.00 each.  In 
addition to the aggregate ticket price, Plaintiffs paid a 
shipping charge of $11.95 and a fee for Defendant’s services of 
$59.60, increasing the total amount of her order to $667.55.  
Tickets to the Hannah Montana concert had a face value of $56.00 
apiece. 
The tickets that Ms. Hill purchased were sold by Justin 
Holohan, an accountant living in Massachusetts who had sold 
hundreds of tickets using Defendant’s website.  Mr. Holohan 
owned the tickets in question and selected the sale price.  Mr. 
Holohan did not remember if he used any pricing information 
function available through Defendant’s website to arrive at the 
price he selected for the tickets purchased by Ms. Hill. 
At the time that he registered to use Defendant’s website, 
Mr. Holohan provided various items of personal information and 
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agreed to abide by Defendant’s User Agreement.  In the event 
that a prospective buyer offered to purchase a ticket that Mr. 
Holohan had listed on Defendant’s website, he would receive an 
email from Defendant asking if he wanted to accept the offer.  
If Mr. Holohan accepted the buyer’s offer, he would print out a 
prepaid FedEx™ label and use that label to ship the tickets to 
the purchaser.  Defendant functioned as an intermediary between 
the purchasers and Mr. Holohan, collected credit card 
information from buyers, and provided him with a marketplace in 
which he could sell tickets “to an anonymous party.” 
B. Procedural History 
On 17 October 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, both 
individually and as representatives of a proposed class 
consisting of “all others similarly situated,” against 
Defendant; “John Doe Seller 1,” the individual who sold the 
Hannah Montana tickets to Ms. Hill; and “John Doe Sellers 2,” 
other sellers of tickets using Defendant’s website.  In their 
complaint, which was subsequently amended on two occasions to 
assert additional factual allegations concerning the manner in 
which Defendant’s website operated and to substitute Mr. Holohan 
for “John Doe Seller 1,” Plaintiffs alleged that they had 
purchased four tickets to the Hannah Montana concert at 
substantially in excess of face value and that the Defendant’s 
fee exceeded $3.00 per ticket.  As a result, Plaintiffs claimed 
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that they were entitled to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages based upon Defendant’s alleged violation of N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-344, a statute making it unlawful to sell a ticket 
for more than $3.00 over its face value; Defendant’s decision, 
along with the other defendants, to participate in a civil 
conspiracy to violate N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344; tortious action 
in concert by Defendant and the other defendants; and the fact 
that Defendant had allegedly engaged in an unfair and deceptive 
trade practice in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. 
On 21 April 2008, Defendant moved for dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 
12(b)(6) on the grounds that “Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) preempts the application of state 
law and provides a complete immunity to Plaintiffs’ claims.”  On 
21 July 2008, the trial court entered an order dismissing all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims except for their unfair and deceptive trade 
practices claim. 
On 3 September 2008, Defendant filed an answer to 
Plaintiffs’ complaint in which it denied the material 
allegations set out in that pleading and asserted various 
affirmative defenses, including a contention that Plaintiffs’ 
claim was barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230.  On 25 October 2010, 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment.  On 4 March 
2011, the trial court entered an order determining that 
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Defendant was not entitled to immunity from liability pursuant 
to 47 U.S.C. § 230, that Defendant had violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-344, that Defendant’s conduct constituted an unfair and 
deceptive trade practice, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
judgment in their favor in an undetermined amount with respect 
to the individual claims that they had lodged against Defendant 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.  Defendants noted an 
appeal to this Court from the trial court’s order. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Appealability 
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(a), a 
“judgment is either interlocutory or the final determination of 
the rights of the parties.”  “An interlocutory order is one made 
during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the 
case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in 
order to settle and determine the entire controversy.”  Veazey 
v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh’g denied, 
232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)).  Given that the trial 
court’s order granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
with respect to their individual claims without making a 
specific damage award or addressing Plaintiffs’ request for 
class certification, the order from which Defendant has 
attempted to appeal is clearly interlocutory in nature. 
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As a general proposition, “there is no right of immediate 
appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments.”  Travco Hotels, 
v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 291, 420 S.E.2d 426, 
428 (1992) (citing Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 
723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990).  However, immediate 
appellate review of an interlocutory order is available “when 
the trial court enters a final judgment as to one or more, but 
fewer than all, claims or parties and certifies that there is no 
just reason for delay” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 
54(b) or when “the interlocutory order affects a substantial 
right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-
27(d).  Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161-62, 522 S.E.2d 577, 
579 (1999) (citing DKH Corp. v. Rankin-Patterson Oil Co., 348 
N.C. 583, 585, 500 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1998), and Ostereicher v. 
Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 121-22, 225 S.E.2d 797, 800 (1976).  
Although the trial court appears to have attempted to include a 
certification pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) in 
its summary judgment order and although Defendant contends that 
the trial court’s order is immediately appealable on 
“substantial right” grounds pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
277(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d), we need not determine 
whether the trial court’s summary judgment order is appealable 
as a matter of right since we have decided to assert 
jurisdiction over this case on other grounds. 
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On 24 March 2011, Defendant filed a petition for certiorari 
requesting that, in the event that we concluded that the trial 
court’s summary judgment order was not immediately appealable, 
we grant certiorari because the principal issue before the Court 
was the extent, if any, to which Defendant was immune from 
liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230; because immediate review 
in this instance would promote judicial economy; and because the 
present case involves issues of first impression in North 
Carolina.  Although Plaintiffs opposed Defendant’s request for 
the issuance of a writ of certiorari, we conclude, in the 
exercise of our discretion, that granting the requested writ of 
certiorari would further the interests of justice in this case.  
Stetser v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 165 N.C. App. 1, 12, 598 
S.E.2d 570, 578-79 (2004) (granting certiorari review given “the 
significant impact of this lawsuit, the importance of the issues 
involved and the need for efficient administration of justice”).  
As a result, we conclude that the requested writ of certiorari 
should be issued and that Defendant’s challenges to the trial 
court’s summary judgment order should be reviewed on the merits. 
B. Standard of Review 
A trial court properly grants summary judgment “if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
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any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).  “A party moving for summary 
judgment may prevail if it meets the burden (1) of proving an 
essential element of the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent, 
or (2) of showing through discovery that the opposing party 
cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his 
or her claim.”  Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 
363, 366 (1982) (citations omitted).  “[O]nce the party seeking 
summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts 
to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence 
demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing 
that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.”  
Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C. App. 778, 784-85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 
664, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 262, 546 S.E.2d 401 (2000), 
cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810, cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 950, 122 S. Ct. 345, 151 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2001).  A trial 
court’s decision to grant a summary judgment motion is reviewed 
on a de novo basis.  Va. Electric and Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 
N.C. App. 383, 385, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 
715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986).  As a result of the fact that the 
record does not, as the parties appear to agree, disclose the 
presence of any genuine issue of material fact, the ultimate 
question for our consideration is whether the trial court 
appropriately concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law with respect to their individual 
unfair and deceptive trade practices claim. 
C. Substantive Legal Issues 
1. Introduction 
The undisputed record evidence establishes that the face 
value of each of the tickets at issue here was $56 and that each 
ticket that Mr. Holohan sold to Ms. Hill cost $149, a figure 
that substantially exceeded the limitation on secondary sales 
set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 (providing that “[a]ny 
person, firm, or corporation shall be allowed to add a 
reasonable service fee to the face value of the tickets sold” in 
an amount “not [to] exceed three dollars ($3.00) for each 
ticket” and that “[a]ny person, firm or corporation which sells 
or offers to sell a ticket for a price greater than the price 
permitted by this section . . . shall be guilty of a Class 2 
misdemeanor”);2 that Mr. Holohan owned the tickets, established 
the sale price, and received the sales proceeds, less 
Defendant’s 10% service charge; and that Plaintiffs paid a 
shipping charge and service fee to Defendant.  According to 
Plaintiffs, the trial court correctly determined that Defendant 
violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 on the grounds that (1) 
                     
2
After Plaintiffs initiated the present case, the General 
Assembly amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 and added N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-344.1 to exempt internet ticket sales accompanied by 
a ticket assurance guarantee from the strictures otherwise 
established by that statutory provision. 
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Defendant sold the tickets for an amount in excess of the 
statutorily prescribed maximum and that (2) Defendant charged an 
excessive buyer’s fee.  In response, Defendant contends that it 
did not sell the tickets to Ms. Hill, so that it was not subject 
to limitations on the amount of permissible fees set out in N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-344.  In addition, Defendant argues that it may 
not be held liable to Plaintiffs based upon the price at which 
Mr. Holohan chose to sell his tickets in light of the immunity 
provisions set out in 47 U.S.C. § 230.  In response, Plaintiffs 
argue that Defendant should be deemed responsible for developing 
the relevant content that appeared on its website, which 
consists of the price at which Mr. Holohan elected to sell his 
tickets, so that the exemption from liability created by 47 
U.S.C. § 230 does not apply.  In granting summary judgment in 
favor of Plaintiffs, the trial court determined that Defendant 
was at least partially responsible for the sale price that Mr. 
Holohan established and had, for that reason, been “stripped of 
any immunity” arising under 47 U.S.C. § 230 and that Defendant 
was subject to the fee limitations set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-344.  After carefully scrutinizing the record and studying 
the applicable law, we conclude (1) that a proper inquiry into 
the extent to which Defendant is entitled to claim immunity from 
liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 must focus upon the 
specific content at issue in this case, which is the price at 
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which Mr. Holohan sold the tickets to Ms. Hill; (2) that, after 
construing the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 230 in light of the 
facts of this case, Defendant is entitled to immunity from any 
liability arising from the ticket price established by Mr. 
Holohan; and (3) that Defendant did not “sell” the tickets to 
Ms. Hill or act as the seller’s agent, thereby falling outside 
the scope of the fee limitation provision set out in N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-344.  As a result, we conclude that the trial court’s 
order should be reversed and that this case should be remanded 
to the trial court for the entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant. 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) 
The central issue before the trial court was the extent, if 
any, to which Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
which provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  As a result, the proper resolution of this case 
hinges upon the manner in which 47 U.S.C. § 230 should be 
interpreted. 
In the event that issues arising in a case pertain to 
federal statutes, we are bound by the Supreme Court of the 
United Sates’ interpretation of the federal statutes involved.  
Bouligny, Inc. v. Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 174, 154 S.E.2d 
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344, 356 (1967) (“a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, construing an act of Congress, is conclusive and binding 
on this court.  On the other hand, “North Carolina appellate 
courts are not bound, as to matters of federal law, by decisions 
of federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court.”  
Enoch v. Inman, 164 N.C. App. 415, 420-21, 596 S.E.2d 361, 365 
(2004) (citing Security Mills v. Trust Co., 281 N.C. 525, 529, 
189 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1972)).  However, although they are “not 
binding on North Carolina’s courts, the holdings and underlying 
rationale of decisions rendered by lower federal courts may be 
considered persuasive authority in interpreting a federal 
statute.”  McCracken & Amick, Inc. v. Perdue, 201 N.C. App. 480, 
488, n.4, 687 S.E.2d 690, 695 n.4 (2009) (citing Security Mills, 
281 N.C. at 529, 189 S.E.2d at 269), disc. review denied, 364 
N.C. 241, 698 S.E.2d 400 (2010).  As a result of the fact that 
the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the scope 
of the immunity from liability made available by 47 U.S.C. § 230 
and the fact that neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina have, as of the present date, had a chance to 
construe 47 U.S.C. § 230, we will look to decisions of the lower 
federal courts and other state courts that we deem persuasive in 
attempting to properly interpret the relevant statutory 
language. 
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As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has noted: 
. . . Congress carved out a sphere of 
immunity from state lawsuits for providers 
of interactive computer services[.] . . . 
[47 U.S.C.] § 230 prohibits a “provider or 
user of an interactive computer service” 
from being held responsible “as the 
publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content 
provider.”  § 230(c)(1). 
 
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 
250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937, 
118 S. Ct. 2341, 141 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1998)). 
Although this court has not previously 
interpreted [47 U.S.C. §] 230, we do not 
write on a blank slate.  The other courts 
that have addressed these issues have 
generally interpreted Section 230 immunity 
broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s 
“policy choice . . . not to deter harmful 
online speech through the . . . route of 
imposing tort liability on companies that 
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ 
potentially injurious messages.” . . .  In 
light of these policy concerns, we too find 
that Section 230 immunity should be broadly 
construed. 
 
Universal Communication v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 418-19 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Zeran at 330-31 and citing Carafano v. 
Metroplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003), 
and Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 
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980, 985, n.3, (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824, 121 
S. Ct. 69, 148 L. Ed. 2d 33 (2000)). 
“The language of § 230 sets forth three criteria to qualify 
for the immunity provided.  First, immunity is available only to 
a ‘provider or user of an interactive computer service.’  47 
U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1).  Second, the liability must be based on 
the defendant having acted as a ‘publisher or speaker.’  Ibid. 
Third, immunity can be claimed only with respect to ‘information 
provided by another information content provider.’”  Milgram v. 
Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 305, 317, 16 A.3d 1113, 
1120-21 (2010).  According to 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3), “[t]he term 
‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that 
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service.”  As the Fourth Circuit 
explained in Nemet Chevrolet: 
Assuming a person meets the statutory 
definition of an “interactive computer 
service provider,” the scope of § 230 
immunity turns on whether that person’s 
actions also make it an “information content 
provider.” . . .  Congress thus established 
a general rule that providers of interactive 
computer services are liable only for speech 
that is properly attributable to them. 
 
Nemet at 254 (citing Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419; Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 1031, 129 S. Ct. 600, 172 L. Ed. 2d 456 (2008), Chicago 
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Lawyers’ for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th 
Cir. 2008); and Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31).  Given that the 
record clearly establishes that Defendant operates an 
“interactive computer service” and that Plaintiff’s claim is 
predicated on the theory that Defendant should be held 
responsible for content, in the form of a ticket price that 
substantially exceeded face value, published on its website, the 
relevant issue is whether Defendant functioned as an 
“information content provider” with respect to the ticket price 
at issue here. 
In Fair Housing Coun., San Fernando v. Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), a leading case concerning the scope 
of the exemption from liability granted by 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
which is cited extensively in the trial court’s order, the 
defendant operated a website that matched people offering to 
rent spare rooms with persons looking for a place to live.  In 
order to search or post information on the site, the user was 
required to answer a series of questions, with the only 
available responses being a set of options provided by the 
website addressing the user’s gender, sexual orientation, family 
status, and roommate preferences as they related to these 
criteria.  The user’s responses to these questions became part 
of his or her profile, which could be supplemented with material 
generated exclusively by the user in a box marked “Additional 
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Comments.”  A number of fair housing councils sued the defendant 
on the grounds that both the questionnaire and certain of the 
users’ additional comments violated applicable fair housing 
statutes by allowing users to discriminate on the basis of 
gender, sexual orientation or family status.  In evaluating the 
issues raised by the fair housing council’s complaint, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially 
noted that: 
A website operator can be both a service 
provider and a content provider:  If it 
passively displays content that is created 
entirely by third parties, then it is only a 
service provider with respect to that 
content.  But as to content that it creates 
itself, or is “responsible, in whole or in 
part” for creating or developing, the 
website is also a content provider.  Thus, a 
website may be immune from liability for 
some of the content it displays to the 
public but be subject to liability for other 
content. 
 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (citing Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 
421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d 376 F. 
Appx. 775 (9th Cir. 2010).  In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that: 
[We] interpret the term “development” as 
referring not merely to augmenting the 
content generally, but to materially 
contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.  
In other words, a website helps to develop 
unlawful content, and thus falls within the 
exception to section 230, if it contributes 
materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct. 
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Roommates at 1167-68.  As a result, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, 
a proper analysis of a defendant’s request for immunity based 
upon 47 U.S.C. § 230 necessarily hinges upon the extent to which 
the website “materially contributed” to the development of 
unlawful content. 
In analyzing the specific claims that the fair housing 
councils asserted against the website at issue in Roommates, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the website was not exempt from 
liability with respect to the information that was posted in 
response to the specific questions posed to persons seeking 
housing on the grounds that, since the website selected the 
questions and limited the range of possible answers, it became 
an information content provider with respect to the information 
generated in response to those questions. 
[T]he part of the profile that is alleged to 
offend the Fair Housing Act and state 
housing discrimination laws - the 
information about sex, family status and 
sexual orientation - is provided by 
subscribers in response to Roommate’s 
questions, which they cannot refuse to 
answer if they want to use defendant’s 
services.  By requiring subscribers to 
provide the information as a condition of 
accessing its service, and by providing a 
limited set of pre-populated answers, 
Roommate becomes much more than a passive 
transmitter of information provided by 
others; it becomes the developer, at least 
in part, of that information. 
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Roommates at 1166.  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the website was entitled to immunity with 
respect to any claims arising from information set out in the 
“Additional Comments” box, since the users had the unlimited 
ability to determine the content of the material that was posted 
in that location.  As a result of the general acceptance by 
other federal and state courts of the rubric deemed appropriate 
in Roommates, the appellate cases addressing immunity claims 
arising under 47 U.S.C. § 230 have analyzed the specific content 
alleged to be unlawful rather than examining the entire website 
on a more generic basis. 
According to our research, there have been approximately 
300 reported decisions addressing immunity claims advanced under 
47 U.S.C. § 230 in the lower federal and state courts.  All but 
a handful of these decisions find that the website is entitled 
to immunity from liability.  The limited number of decisions 
which decline to find immunity pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 
include Roommates, which we have discussed above, and another 
decision upon which the trial court placed particular emphasis, 
FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
In Accusearch, the defendant operated a website that 
solicited requests to purchase the phone records of third 
parties, with those records having been obtained through the 
efforts of paid “researchers.”  In determining that the website 
-21- 
was not entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to 47 
U.S.C. § 230 with respect to that material, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a website 
“[wa]s ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content 
only if it in some way specifically encourages development of 
what is offensive about the content.”  Accusearch at 1199. 
[T]he offending content was the disclosed 
confidential information . . .  Accusearch 
was responsible for the development of that 
content[.] . . .  Accusearch solicited 
requests for such confidential information 
and then paid researchers to obtain it. 
. . .  Accusearch knew that its researchers 
were obtaining the information through fraud 
or other illegality. 
 
Id.  In concluding that the website was not immune from 
liability under 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Tenth Circuit emphasized 
the fact that obtaining the personal phone records of third 
parties is almost always unlawful.
3
  As a result, the relevant 
portion of the website’s business consisted of paying 
“researchers” to illegally obtain information and providing the 
illegally obtained information to its customers, a set of 
actions which deprived the website of the ability to rely on the 
immunity provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
                     
3
The exceptions to this general rule, which apply to 
situations such as provision of emergency services, billing for 
telecommunications services, and emergency situations involving 
a risk of death, would not be likely to stimulate an inquiry 
from a private person. 
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The analysis utilized in other decisions holding websites 
liable despite the immunity provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 230 is 
similar to that deemed appropriate in Accusearch and Roommates.  
For example, in Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2525 *11 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 10, 2012), the 
website operator was found to have participated in the 
development of defamatory posts by appending a “tagline” to the 
postings of others and adding his own comments, actions “which a 
jury could certainly interpret as adopting the preceding 
allegedly defamatory comments.”  In other words, once again, 
liability was predicated upon the website’s decision to 
affirmatively adopt or ensure the presentation of unlawful 
material.  As a result, we conclude that “‘[n]ear-unanimous case 
law holds that Section 230(c) affords immunity to ICSs against 
suits that seek to hold an ICS liable for third-party content’” 
and that “courts consistently have held that [47 U.S.C.] § 
230(c)(1) offers broad immunity for ICSs to stimulate robust 
avenues of speech.”  Collins v. Purdue University, 703 F. Supp. 
2d 862, 877 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 
Civ. Rights v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 681, 689 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006) (listing a large number of cases upholding a finding 
of immunity pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 
(7th Cir. 2008)), partial summary judgment granted on other 
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grounds by Collins v. Purdue Univ., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31013 
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2011). 
The reported decisions construing the immunity provisions 
of 47 U.S.C. § 230 have rejected a number of efforts to expand 
the range of factual situations in which a website is deprived 
of the immunity from liability provided by that statutory 
provision.  For example, in Zeran, the plaintiff was the victim 
of a hoax in which 
an unidentified person posted a message on 
an AOL bulletin board advertising “Naughty 
Oklahoma T-Shirts.”  The posting described 
the sale of shirts featuring offensive and 
tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 
1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City.  Those 
interested in purchasing the shirts were 
instructed to call “Ken” at Zeran’s home 
phone number[.] . . .  As a result of this 
anonymously perpetrated prank, Zeran 
received a high volume of calls, comprised 
primarily of angry and derogatory messages, 
but also including death threats. . . .  
[When a radio station publicized the post,] 
Zeran was inundated with death threats and 
other violent calls from Oklahoma City 
residents. 
 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.  Mr. Zeran sued AOL, arguing that it was 
liable for failing to remove the post after Zeran had provided 
specific notice of the website’s defamatory nature.  On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the website’s immunity claim, stating 
that: 
[Zeran] contends that interpreting [47 
U.S.C.] § 230 to impose liability on service 
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providers with knowledge of defamatory 
content on their services is consistent with 
the statutory purposes[.]  Zeran fails, 
however, to understand the practical 
implications of notice liability in the 
interactive computer service context. . . .  
Because the probable effects of distributor 
liability on the vigor of Internet speech 
and on service provider self-regulation are 
directly contrary to § 230’s statutory 
purposes, we will not assume that Congress 
intended to leave liability upon notice 
intact. 
 
Zeran at 333.  As a result, “[i]t is, by now, well established 
that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided 
is not enough to make it the service provider’s own speech.”  
Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33) (other 
citation omitted). 
Similarly, the decisions construing 47 U.S.C. § 230 have 
generally held that, if the tools provided by a website may be 
used to generate either lawful or unlawful content depending on 
decisions made by the user, these tools are “neutral” and do not 
implicate the website in the development of unlawful content.  
Thus, in Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 
2010), the district court held that Google was immune from 
plaintiff’s claims that Google’s website had unlawfully used 
plaintiff’s trademarked name “Styrotrim” as a suggested keyword 
in Google’s “AdWords” program, which allows advertisers to bid 
on the words that appear as suggested search terms when a user 
began a search.  Although the plaintiff argued that, by 
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providing the keyword suggestion tool, Google became an 
“information content provider,” the district court held that: 
. . . Defendant does not provide the content 
of the “Sponsored Link” advertisements.  It 
provides a space and a service and 
thereafter charges for its service.  By 
suggesting keywords to competing advertisers 
Defendant merely helps third parties to 
refine their content. . . .  Defendant’s 
keyword suggestion tool hardly amounts to 
the participation necessary to disqualify it 
of CDA immunity.  Rather it is a “neutral 
tool,” that does nothing more than provide 
options that advertisers could adopt or 
reject at their discretion, thus entitling 
the operator to immunity. 
 
Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (citing Goddard v. Google, Inc., 
640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). 
Moreover, the fact that a website operates a commercial 
business or makes a profit has no relevance to the immunity 
determination.  As one district court has recently explained: 
The complained-of actions taken by Backpage 
to increase the revenues it derives from its 
website, e.g., touting its website as a 
“highly tuned marketing site” and 
instructing posters of ads on how to best 
increase the impact of those ads, do[] not 
defeat § 230 immunity.  “[T]he fact that a 
website elicits online content for profit is 
immaterial; the only relevant inquiry is 
whether the interactive service provider 
‘creates’ or ‘develops’ that content.” . . .  
In the instant case, to find Backpage to be 
not immune from suit based on M.A.’s 
allegations about how it structured its 
website in order to increase its profits 
would be to create a for-profit exception to 
§ 230’s broad grant of immunity.  This the 
Court may not do. 
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M.A. v. Vill. Voice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90588 at *23-24 (E.D. 
Mo. 2011) (quoting Goddard v. Google, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
101890, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2008), and citing Lycos 478 F.3d at 
420-21 (stating that a website operator did not become an 
information content provider “merely because the ‘construct and 
operation’ of the web site might have some influence on the 
content of the postings”) and Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 
(stating that a questionnaire employed by a dating service 
website to facilitate the creation of profiles did not transform 
the website into an information content provider since all 
content selection decisions were made by posters and since no 
profile would have  any content in the absence of creative 
activity by the poster) (other citation omitted). 
Similarly, the fact that a website acted in such a manner 
as to encourage the publication of unlawful material does not 
preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230.  For 
example, in Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 143081 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011), the plaintiff claimed 
that “[the defendant] acted as an ‘information content provider’ 
by, among other things, (1) encouraging negative complaints; (2) 
inviting consumers to post public complaints on its website; (3) 
displaying those negative postings as prominently as possible 
. . . ; and (4) increasing the prominence of [the defendant’s] 
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webpages by various allegedly improper means, including by using 
plaintiffs’ [trade]marks.”  Ascentive at *69.  In rejecting this 
contention, the district court held that: 
[T]here is simply “no authority for the 
proposition that [encouraging the 
publication of defamatory content] makes the 
website operator responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the ‘creation or development’ of 
every post on the site. . . .  Unless 
Congress amends the [CDA], it is legally 
(although perhaps not ethically) beside the 
point whether defendants refuse to remove 
the material, or how they might use it to 
their advantage.” 
 
Ascentive at *69.  (quoting Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric 
Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding 
that “ripoffreport.com” was not an information content provider 
even though the defendants allegedly encouraged defamatory 
reviews by others for their own financial benefit). 
Finally, the decisions construing 47 U.S.C. § 230 have 
declined invitations to exempt the “negligent publishing” of 
offensive or unlawful content from the protections afforded by 
47 U.S.C. § 230.  For example, in Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 
F. Supp. 2d 961, 967-68 (N.D. Ill. 2009), the plaintiff, who 
served as the Sheriff of Cook County, sued Craigslist on the 
basis of allegations that the website’s adult section 
constituted a public nuisance.  After noting that “Sheriff 
Dart’s complaint could be construed to allege ‘negligent 
publishing,’” the district court rejected any contention that 
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negligence sufficed to overcome the immunity granted by 47 
U.S.C. § 230, noting that “[a] claim against an online service 
provider for negligently publishing harmful information created 
by its users treats the defendant as the ‘publisher’ of that 
information.” (citing Chicago Lawyers’ Committee, 461 F. Supp. 
2d 681, and Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (other 
citation omitted)).  As a result, the reported decisions 
construing 47 U.S.C. § 230 have treated the relevant statutory 
language as creating a broad exemption from liability even when 
the substantive facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim are 
compelling.  See, e.g., M.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90588 
(holding that immunity was available pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 
despite the fact that a minor was subjected to sex trafficking 
as the result of ads placed on defendant’s website) and Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1098 (holding that immunity was available pursuant 
to 47 U.S.C. § 230 based upon a website’s failure to remove 
defamatory postings despite the fact that the “case stems from a 
dangerous, cruel, and highly indecent use of the internet for 
the apparent purpose of revenge”). 
Thus, after carefully reviewing decisions such as Roommates 
and Accusearch, in which websites were deprived of the 
opportunity to claim immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230, we conclude 
that: 
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Those cases . . . are easily distinguishable 
[from the present case].  In Roommates.com, 
the non-parties providing the data were 
required to post actionable material to the 
defendant website as a condition of use, and 
the website’s “work in developing the 
discriminatory questions, discriminatory 
answers and discriminatory search mechanism 
[was] directly related to the alleged 
illegality of the site.” . . .  This case 
also differs considerably from Accusearch 
Inc., where the defendant website paid 
researchers to obtain information for the 
site to disseminate that “would almost 
inevitably require [the researcher] to 
violate the Telecommunications Act or to 
circumvent it by fraud or theft.”  There is 
no comparable allegation against 
[Defendant]. 
 
Shiamili v Real Estate Group of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 281, 292, 
952 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (2011) (quoting Roommates, 521 F3d at 1172 
and Accusearch Inc., 570 F3d at 1191-92).  For that reason, we 
further conclude that, in order to lose the benefit of the 
exemption from liability granted by 47 U.S.C. § 230 based upon 
content actually posted by third parties, an analysis of the 
results reached in persuasive decisions from other jurisdictions 
establishes that, in order to “materially contribute” to the 
creation of unlawful material, a website must effectively 
control the content posted by those third parties or take other 
actions which essentially ensure the creation of unlawful 
material.  Although the record might support a determination 
that Defendant encouraged the posting of “market-based” prices 
on its website or was cognizant of the risk that tickets sold on 
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its website would be priced in excess of face value, such 
evidence does not suffice to support a conclusion that 
Defendant’s website essentially ensured that unlawful content 
would be posted. 
3. Analysis of Trial Court’s Order 
Although the trial court concluded that Defendant was “in 
total control of the transaction” and stated that “[t]he only 
thing [that Defendant] does not do is enter the actual price or 
make the final price decision for most sellers,” the undisputed 
evidence establishes that Mr. Holohan was the owner of the 
Hannah Montana tickets that Ms. Hill purchased and that Mr. 
Holohan, rather than Defendant, set the price of the tickets.  
The trial court did not determine, and the record does not 
indicate, that Defendant priced the tickets, directed or 
required Mr. Holohan to charge a particular ticket price, or 
acted as Mr. Holohan’s agent in making that determination.  As a 
result, we conclude, consistently with the undisputed evidence 
and the language of the trial court’s order, that Defendant was 
not “responsible, in whole or in part,” for creating or 
developing the content at issue here, which is the price at 
which Mr. Holohan sold his tickets, and, for that reason, that 
Defendant is immune from liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 
as the result of claims based upon that particular content. 
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A careful review of the trial court’s order reflects that, 
instead of focusing upon the specific content at issue in this 
case, the trial court determined that Defendant’s website, 
considered as a whole, was not entitled to immunity from 
liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230.  As part of this process, 
the trial court placed considerable emphasis on certain business 
practices in which Defendant engaged and certain features of 
Defendant’s website that the trial court believed to encourage 
the reselling of tickets at a price substantially above face 
value.  Reduced to its essence, the trial court’s analysis rests 
upon the belief that, since Defendant’s “business model” and 
various features of Defendant’s website tended to provide 
incentives for the selling of tickets at a price above face 
value, the website, viewed in its entirety, was not immune from 
liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230.  We conclude, however, 
that the trial court’s “entire website” approach was fatally 
flawed in a number of respects. 
In the course of adopting this erroneous “entire website” 
approach, the trial court discussed the features that Defendant 
made available to ticket sellers who sold large numbers of 
tickets and addressed the impact that actions taken by such 
“large sellers” might have on ticket prices.  However, the 
undisputed record evidence establishes that Mr. Holohan was not 
a “large seller,” so those features had no impact on the 
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generation of the allegedly unlawful content.  Similarly, the 
trial court discussed contracts between Defendant and musical 
performers despite the fact that such agreements had nothing to 
do with the present transaction.  As a result, this aspect of 
the trial court’s reasoning simply had no bearing on the 
required immunity analysis. 
The trial court also predicated its determination that 
Defendant was not entitled to take advantage of the immunity 
made available by 47 U.S.C. § 230 based, at least in part, upon 
the nature of the various customer service features that were 
made available through Defendant’s website.  According to the 
trial court, Defendant “controlled” the transaction by acting as 
an intermediary between buyer and seller.  In addition, the 
trial court noted that Defendant offered both buyers and sellers 
certain guarantees and assumed responsibility for handling the 
mechanics required to complete the transaction.  The extent to 
which the features made available by Defendant are worth the fee 
that Defendant charges for its services is a decision which must 
be made by each individual buyer and seller.  However, none of 
these features had any impact on the extent to which Mr. Holohan 
had complete control over the price at which he chose to resell 
the Hannah Montana tickets at issue here, rendering those 
features irrelevant for purposes of determining the extent to 
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which Defendant was entitled to immunity pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 
230. 
In addition, the trial court discussed the pricing tools 
available to users of Defendant’s website and suggested that 
these tools encouraged sellers to price tickets unlawfully.  A 
number of the tools mentioned in the trial court’s order were 
only available to large volume sellers, such as assistance in 
uploading tickets in bulk or calculating the desired price, and 
had no bearing on Mr. Holohan’s pricing decisions for that 
reason.  However, certain other features upon which the trial 
court relied were more widely available, such as the information 
that Defendant provided to sellers concerning the prices at 
which tickets to the same event had been sold by others.  The 
pricing feature in question is, however, a prototypically 
“neutral tool,” since that feature merely provided additional 
information to sellers without suggesting, much less requiring, 
that they should adjust the prices that they were charging for 
certain tickets.  As a result, none of these aspects of the 
trial court’s factual analysis operated to deprive Defendant of 
the immunity established by 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
Aside from its reliance upon information that did not bear 
upon the price that Mr. Holohan charged Ms. Hill for tickets to 
the Hannah Montana concert, the trial court’s decision rests 
upon certain legal conclusions that are inconsistent with the 
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decisions reached by other courts whose reasoning we find 
persuasive.  For example, the trial court stated that 
“[c]onscious disregard by an internet service provider of known 
and persistent violations of law by content providers may impact 
the courts’ determinations of the service provider’s claim to 
immunity, especially where the ISP profits from the violations,” 
and that the use of Defendant’s “website to scalp tickets in 
violation of North Carolina law was a predictable consequence of 
[Defendant’s] business model.”  As we have already demonstrated, 
however, the prevailing tendency among decisions construing the 
relevant statutory language is to hold that the immunity 
provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230 is (1) not defeated by evidence 
tending to show that the website had notice of the unlawful 
posting; (2) not affected by the fact that a website attempts to 
earn a profit; and (3) not subject to any liability on the basis 
of “reasonable foreseeability” or “willful blindness” analysis.  
Thus, the fact that Defendant may have been on notice that its 
website could be used to make unlawful sales and that certain of 
Defendant’s practices may have provided incentives for the 
overpricing of certain tickets does not support a decision 
stripping Defendant of its immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 In its order, the trial court also placed considerable 
reliance upon NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 Mass L. Rep. 478, 
2009 Mass. Super. LEXIS 97 (2009), a decision rendered by a 
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trial court judge in Massachusetts.  In NPS, the trial court 
denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment directed toward 
the plaintiff’s intentional interference with advantageous 
relations claim.  In that case, although denying that it had 
acted on the basis of an improper motive, the defendant 
“essentially concede[d]” that it had knowingly induced season 
ticket holders to breach their contract with the plaintiff, a 
professional football team.  Aside from the fact that the 
evidentiary and procedural context present in NPS is 
substantially different from that before the Court in this case, 
we simply do not find the reasoning employed by NPS persuasive, 
believe that it is inconsistent with the decisions concluding 
that knowledge of unlawful content does not strip a website of 
the immunity from liability granted under 47 U.S.C. § 230,, and 
decline to follow it in deciding the present case.
4
 
Finally, the trial court discussed a hypothetical situation 
in reaching its decision that we believe to be readily 
distinguishable from the facts of this case.  In its order, the 
trial court stated that, “if a StubHub employee offered to sell 
                     
4
Similarly, the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in City of Chicago v. StubHub!, 
Inc., 624 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2010), has no real bearing upon the 
proper resolution of this case given that the issue before the 
Seventh Circuit in that case was the extent, if any, to which 
Defendant was required to remit certain taxes rather than the 
extent, if any, to which Defendant was liable for allegedly 
unlawful third party content. 
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another person’s tickets to the ACC Tournament at scalper’s 
prices in front of the coliseum, that employee would have 
violated the statute even though they did not set the price for 
the owner.”  However, unlike the situation posited in the trial 
court’s hypothetical, the present record contains no indication 
that Defendant acted as Mr. Holohan’s agent in setting the 
challenged ticket price.  Instead, the undisputed evidence 
establishes that Defendant simply functioned as a broker, 
effectively putting a buyer and a seller into contact with each 
other in order to facilitate a sale at a price established by 
the seller.  As a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude 
that Defendant was entitled to claim the benefit of the immunity 
created by 47 U.S.C. § 230 and that this immunity operates to 
bar Plaintiffs’ individual claim stemming from the price at 
which Ms. Hill purchased tickets to the Hannah Montana concert. 
4. Fees Charged by Defendant 
In addition, the trial court concluded that Defendant was 
liable to Plaintiffs for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 
based upon the fees that Defendant charged buyers such as Ms. 
Hill.  Although Plaintiffs argue that Defendant should be held 
liable for collecting excessive fees as either the seller of the 
tickets or as the seller’s agent, we conclude that the record 
does not establish that Defendant possessed either seller or 
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agent status and cannot, for that reason, be held liable to 
Plaintiffs on fee-related grounds. 
According to the version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 
applicable to this case, a person or entity is “allowed to add a 
reasonable service fee to the face value of the tickets sold” 
that “may not exceed three dollars ($3.00) for each ticket,” 
with any person or entity “sell[ing] or offer[ing] to sell a 
ticket for a price greater than” the permissible price subject 
to a criminal sanction.  The plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-344 imposes liability upon either the seller or, presumably, 
the seller’s agents.5  As we have already indicated, the 
undisputed record evidence shows that Mr. Holohan sold the 
tickets in question, that Defendant provided an independent 
brokerage function rather than acting as Mr. Holohan’s agent, 
and that the fees that Defendant charged related to its own 
services rather than services provided by Mr. Holohan.  As a 
matter of fact, the user agreement to which Mr. Holohan agreed 
as a prerequisite for selling tickets on Defendant’s website 
specifically states that “no agency, partnership, joint venture, 
                     
5
Although Plaintiffs argue that the reference to “[a]ny 
person, firm or corporation” in that portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-344 authorizing the assessment of service charges 
demonstrates that the reach of the relevant statutory provision 
extends beyond sellers and their agents, we do not believe that 
the language in question can be read in that manner given that 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344 only sanctions the assessment of fees 
associated with the sale or resale of tickets. 
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employer-employee or franchisor-franchisee relationship is 
intended or created by this Agreement.”  As a result, we 
conclude that the undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant 
was neither a ticket seller nor the ticket seller’s agent; that 
the fees that Defendant charges are not, for that reason, 
subject to the strictures of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344; and that 
the trial court erred by making a contrary determination in the 
course of granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 
III. Conclusion 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, 
under 47 U.S.C. § 230, Defendant is entitled to immunity from 
Plaintiffs’ claim stemming from the sale of tickets to the 
Hannah Montana concert at a price in excess of face value and 
that the fees that Defendant charges for its services did not 
violate N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344.  In view of the fact that 
Plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim hinged 
upon determinations that Defendant was not entitled to immunity 
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 and that Defendant charged fees in 
excess of those authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344, we 
further conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs with respect to their individual 
claims in reliance upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and that the 
trial court should, instead, have granted summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant with respect to those claims.  As a result, 
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the trial court’s order should be, and hereby is, reversed and 
this case should be, and hereby is, remanded to Guilford County 
Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
REVERSED. 
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur. 
